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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The McBrides, Petitioners/Respondents ("McBrides"), did
not file a cross-appeal, so are barred from pursuing any crossassignment of error or claim for relief beyond affirmation of the
lower court's decision.

Utah law on that issue has been well-

settled for many years.

The Court should not review the record,

grant relief, or in any way consider the McBride's crossassignments of error.
The district court correctly applied the 1987 Recovery
Fund Act to this case, inasmuch as the petition against the
Recovery Fund was filed in May 1988, while the 1987 statute was
in effect.

The McBrides urge the Court to apply the 1985

Recovery Fund statute to this case, because that statute was in
effect when their cause of action against Steven R. Carter
("Carter") arose.

However, as important as the underlying

judgment against Carter is to this case, it is the cause of
action against the Recovery Fund which should determine which
statute applies to the petition.

The cause of action against the

Fund did not arise until the judgment against Carter was clearly
uncollectible, apparently in May 1988.
The Utah Division of Real Estate ("Division") is only
subrogated to the portion of a judgment actually paid out of the
Recovery Fund.

The petitioner reserves all rights to the

remainder of the judgment, including attorney's fees, costs,
punitive damages, and any amount in excess of $10,000.
There is ongoing concern by the Division and the Utah
Real Estate Commission ("Commission") that the Recovery Fund

remain viable and capable of providing at least partial relief to
those having qualifying claims against the Recovery Fund.

The

fees have been raised in an attempt to accomplish that end.

The

Fund is not the panacea that the McBrides see it as being, but
was created to provide a measure of relief to those injured by
defaulting real estate licensees, up to the statutory limit of
$10,000 per transaction.
The McBrides' claim that the underlying judgment
against Carter is res

judicata

against the Division on the issue

of whether or not Carter's fraudulent acts constituted
transactions is itself barred by their failure to bring a crossappeal.

However, the Division has not requested that the Supreme

Court change the underlying judgment, but simply look at it and
see that it's characterization of Carter's acts as "transactions"
is inconsistent with the Findings of Fact, and that those "five
transactions of fraud" are certainly not real estate transactions
as contemplated in the Recovery Fund statute.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO CROSS APPEAL WAS FILED, THEREFORE THE ONLY RELIEF
THE MCBRIDES MAY REQUEST IS AFFIRMATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER.
The McBrides did not file a cross-appeal claiming error
on the part of the trial court, and are therefore barred from
raising any issue not raised by the Division's appeal or from
making any prayer for relief other than affirmation of the trial
court's order.
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It has been the law in Utah for many years that
respondents must file a cross-appeal in order to pursue any
cross-assignment of error or modification of the lower court's
decision.

As the Utah Supreme Court held in Hartford Accident &

Indemnity Co. v. Cleqg, 135 P.2d 919, 103 Utah 414 at 426, "No
affirmative relief can be granted to respondent, even if he were
entitled to such, because no cross-appeal has been filed."

In

that same decision, the Court quoted from Jensen v. Utah Railway
Co., 270 P. 349 at 361, 72 Utah 366 at 398.
This court, in a number of cases, considering the
purpose and function of cross-assignments has held that
cross-assignments cannot avail the respondent to have
the record reviewed, to afford him a modification of
the judgment or any affirmative relief, and that to
review a record for such purpose, and to grant such
relief, a cross-appeal is essential, and assignments
made thereon in the same manner as on the appeal by the
appellant, and that cross-assignments perform the
office and function of only defending and upholding the
j udgment. (Empha sis added.)
Inasmuch as Petitioners/Respondents failed to file a
cross-appeal as provided for by Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, the Court should not consider the following
issues raised in the Petitioners/Respondents' brief:
1. Whether the underlying judgment against Carter is
res judicata
on the issue of whether or not Carter
committed five fraudulent "transactions" or acts.
2. Whether the McBrides are entitled to collect
attorney's fees and costs from the Recovery Fund.
3. Whether the McBrides are entitled to have the
District Court's Order upheld for reasons other than
those expressed by the court in it's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE STATUTE
GOVERNING THIS CASE WAS THE REAL ESTATE RESEARCH AND RECOVERY
FUND ACT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE MCBRIDE'S PETITION AGAINST THE
FUND WAS FILED.
The McBrides would have this Court apply two different
Recovery Fund statutes to the issues raised in their brief.

The

McBrides support their arguments with whichever version of the
statute best supports the argument.

The relevant sections of the

two statutes are as follows:
§ 61-2a-5(l) [Effective April 29, 1985]
61-2a-4. JUDGMENT AGAINST REAL ESTATE LICENSE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, OR DECEIT - VERIFIED
PETITION FOR ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT FROM FUND LIMITATIONS AND PROCEDURE.
(1) If any person obtains a final judgment in a
court of competent jurisdiction against a real
estate licensee in this state, based upon fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate
transaction, that person may, upon termination of
all proceedings including appeals, file a verified
petition in the court where the judgment was
entered for an order directing payment from the
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund
for the actual damages included in the judgment
and unpaid, but not more than $10,000. Recovery
from the fund shall be for the actual damages
included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more
than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more
than $50,000 for any one licensee.

§ 61-2a-5(l) [Effective April 27, 1987]
61-2a-5. JUDGMENT AGAINST REAL ESTATE LICENSEE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, OR DECEIT - VERIFIED
PETITION FOR ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT FROM FUND LIMITATIONS AND PROCEDURE.
(1) A Person may bring a claim against the
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund
only if he provides written notice to the Division
of Real Estate at the time he files an action
against a real estate licensee alleging fraud,
- 4 -

misrepresentation, or deceit. Within 30 days of
receipt of the notice, the Division shall have an
unconditional right to intervene in the action.
If the person making a claim against the fund
obtains a final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee
based upon fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in
any real estate transaction, the person making the
claim may, upon termination of all proceedings
including appeals, file a verified petition in the
court where the judgment was entered for an order
directing payment from the Real Estate Education,
Research, and Recovery Fund for the uncollected
actual damages included in the judgment and
unpaid. Recovery from the fund may not include
punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest, or
court costs. No recovery from the fund may be
more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no
more than $50,000 for any one licensee.
As the Court can see, there are substantial and
significant differences between these two sections.
The McBrides use the 1987 statute, the one applied by
the district court, when they argue that the Division should be
barred from addressing the underlying judgment against Carter
because notice was given to the Division as required by the
statute.

They also claim that the Division could have exercised

its "unconditional right to intervene in the action" against
Carter, (p. 20, Respondent's Brief)

However, there were no such

provisions in the law at the time the McBrides were engaged in
litigation with Carter.

The judgment against Carter was entered

on January 27, 1987, and the 1987 statute did not go into effect
until April 27, 1987.

Laws of Utah 1987, chapter 48 section 11.

While the McBrides attempt to take advantage of some
perceived advantage the 1987 statute gives them in the above
argument,

they turn around and argue that the 1985 statute,

rather than the 1987 statute should apply to this case because

_ s_

their cause of action against Carter arose in January 1986.

The

issue of which statute applies does not turn on when the cause of
action against Carter arose, but rather, when did the cause of
action against the Recovery Fund arise?

That cause of action

arose when it became apparent that the judgment against Carter
was uncollectible.

Apparently the McBrides' cause of action

against the Recovery Fund arose in May 1988 when the petition was
filed.

Therefore, the 1987 statute which was in effect at that

time should govern this claim.

POINT III
PAYMENT FROM THE RECOVERY FUND SUBROGATES THE FUND TO
ONLY THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT ACTUALLY PAID, THEREBY LEAVING
THE MCBRIDES WITH THE RIGHT TO COLLECT THE BALANCE OF THEIR
JUDGMENT-INCLUDING THEIR COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES-FROM CARTER.
As was stated in the Division's original brief, the
Recovery Fund was not established to provide total compensation
to victims of defaulting real estate licensees, but was
established to provide at least partial relief up to $10,000 per
real estate transaction.

Had the Legislature intended the Fund

to provide total compensation to every injured party, it most
certainly would have enacted a statute which did not contain
maximum limits of recovery, and would not have set forth specific
conditions precedent to filing a petition against the fund.

It

would have also had to appropriate state monies for such a fund,
inasmuch as the real estate profession could not possibly selffund such an undertaking.
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The McBrides espouse a claim that it would be
economically infeasible for potential Recovery Fund claimants to
prosecute lawsuits if they could only hope to recover a maximum
of $10,000 per real estate transaction from the Fund.

Again, the

Recovery Fund is not the panacea that the McBrides see it as
being.

The Recovery Fund confers a benefit, albeit a limited

one, on the judgment creditors of defaulting real estate
licensees that the judgment creditors of other debtors do not
have.

Unlike judgment creditors dealing with non-licensees, the

judgment creditor in a qualifying real estate transaction has the
opportunity to actually recover up to $10,000 of the money lost
because of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit in the transaction.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-9 of the 1987 statute provided
that the Division shall be subrogated to the rights of the
judgment creditor for the amount of the judgment paid out of the
Fund.

It also provided that payment from the fund on behalf of a

licensee would automatically revoke that license until the fund
was repaid in full.

The balance of the judgment after

subrogation by the Division, should there be any portion which
would not qualify for payment out of the fund, such as attorney's
fees, costs, interest, punitive damages, or an amount in excess
of the $10,000 per transaction limit,

remains with the claimant.

Payment from the Recovery Fund does not extinguish any rights the
judgment creditor has against the debtor/licensee, it simply
transfers to the fund subrogation rights equal to the amount paid
out, and does not effect the right of the creditor to continue to
pursue the licensee for the balance of the judgment.
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Contrary to the McBrides' claim, the viability of the
Recovery Fund is a matter of continuing concern to the Division
and the Utah Real Estate Commission.

Counsel for the McBrides,

quoting a five year old article in the Utah Real Estate News,
would have the court believe that there are currently few claims
against the

Recovery Fund, and that the fund is so large that

there is plenty of money for the recoveries he endorses.
However, the current status of the fund is more accurately
reflected by a notice in the March 1989 edition of the Utah Real
Estate News which states in part, under the heading "INCREASE IN
RECOVERY FUND FEE-Effective June 1, 1989":

"Because of the

increase in the number of claims against the Fund, the Real
Estate Commission has recently voted to increase the amount of
money going into the fund to the maximum allowed."

The fees

will be raised to the statutory limit of $18 per year for
brokers, and $12 per year for salesagents.
Surely, the Division and the Real Estate Commission are
in a much better position than anyone else to judge the ability
of the fund to handle the pending and anticipated claims against
the Recovery Fund, inasmuch as they are privy to the volume,
nature, and time frame in which such claims may be filed.

Since

April 1987 the Division has been receiving notice of potential
claims, and is often involved in disciplinary proceedings which
indicate potential claims.
The McBrides also argue that they are entitled to
collect attorney's fees and costs from the Recovery Fund.
are barred from raising this claim because of the lack of a
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They

cross-appeal.

However, the district court correctly held that

the 1987 Recovery Fund Statute did not allow recovery of
attorney's fees and costs from the fund.

The McBrides' argument

that the "third-party tort rule" found in South Sanpitch Co. v.
Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Filed December 13, 1988), applies, is
irrelevant to this case because the petition against the recovery
fund is clearly not an action to quiet title.

South Sanpitch may

have been relevant to the case against Carter, but has no
relevance to a claim against the Recovery Fund which arises due
to the uncollectibility of the Carter judgment.
The McBrides also present a most unfortunate, and
false, scenario to the Court in an attempt to counter the
Division's interpretation of the Recovery Fund Statute.

On page

16 of Respondent's brief, they use the example of a "commercial
high rise of 200-300 offices" listed for sale or lease with a
real estate licensee.

Counsel would have this Court believe that

if "100 prospective buyers or tenants" gave deposits to a
licensee who converted it to his personal use, "then under the
Division's interpretation of the statute, since only one parcel
of real property is involved and since there was only one listing
agreement, the 100 victims could only recover a total of only
$10,000 or $100 each."
Division's position.
scenario —

This is a mischaracterization of the

Using the Petitioner/Respondents'

they have described a situation where there are 200-

300 parcels of real property, i.e. condominiums under UCA § 57-81, et seq.

If 100 purchasers or tenants enter into real estate

transactions handled through the licensee, there is certainly the

possibility for 100 claims against the Recovery Fund, depending
on how many real estate transactions are involved.

If those 100

people turned out to be 50 married couples purchasing 50
condominiums, then there are 50 potential claims because there
are 50 transactions.

Each of those 50 claims would be limited to

a maximum recovery of $10,000, and once the $50,000.00 ceiling
was reached, the Fund could not pay out any more money on behalf
of that licensee.

POINT IV
THE DIVISION IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, OR ANT
OTHER LEGAL THEORY FROM ASKING THIS COURT TO FIND THAT THE TERM
-TRANSACTION" AS USED IN THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT IS NOT A REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTION AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE RECOVERY FUND STATUTE.
The McBrides present a res

judicata

argument in an

attempt to keep the Court from addressing one of the pivotal
issues in this case, namely defining a real estate transaction.
The Court is not being asked to change the underlying judgment,
simply to interpret it.

The underlying judgment against Carter

describes certain acts committed by Carter which constituted
fraud and misrepresentation (R.101, no. 5). In the Conclusions
of Law and Judgment these acts are called "five transactions of
fraud and misrepresentation"

and reference back to paragraph 5,

6, and 7 of the Findings of Fact.

There is no refercmce to

"transactions" in those paragraphs, but only reference to the
court's finding at least five fraudulent acts by the
defendant(Carter).

The term "transaction" only appears in the

Conclusion of Law and Judgment drafted by Mr. Miles in the
default proceeding.

Calling the unilateral acts described in the
- 10 -

Findings of Facts Htransactions" does not make them transactions,
let alone real estate transactions as referenced in UCA § 61-2a5(1).
The Division has a duty to challenge any part of the
underlying judgment which does not meet the statutory
requirements established as conditions precedent to recovery from
the Fund, and the Division owes a duty to licensees and potential
claimants to oppose overpayments from the fund.

The Division

simply does not see how calling a series of unilateral acts
performed by a real estate licensee "transactions" turns those
acts into the commonly accepted notion of a real estate
transaction.

Real estate transactions are give and take affairs,

involving negotiations, buying and selling, or attempts to buy
and sell between parties.

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third

Edition, defines transaction as:
"A Matter of dealing between parties, the word
implying action, consent, knowledge, or
acquiescence on the part of both of them. An
act or agreement, or several acts or agreements
having connection with each other, in which two
or more persons are concerned and by which legal
relations between them are altered."
The McBrides argue that the case of Dombalian v. Fox,
152 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 Cal. App. 3d 763 (1979), does not support
the Division's argument because the California Recovery Fund
Statute was not identical to the Utah statute.

Of course, there

are some differences between the two states' statutes, however
both statutes have similar functions and the procedures which
trigger the statute's effect are very similar.

The Division

offers Dombalian to the Court as a very reasonable, workable, and
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sensible definition of what a real estate transaction is. The
court in Dombalian said:
"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning.
It may comprehend a series of many occurrences,
depending not so much upon the immediateness of
their connection as upon their logical relationship. . .
[1] As amorphous as the word is, we should be
going against its grain were we to hold that each
separate event involving a listing agreement for
a single piece of property involved a different
transaction. And the Legislature has made it
plain that the grain is not to be resisted.
CONCLUSION
The McBrides paint the Division as being niggardly and
represent to the Court that "it is conceivable that the Division
could . . . have the statute amended to exclude such claims from
recovery in the year or more it may take to prosecutes the claims
to judgment . . . "

This statement by the Petitioners/Respondents

is patently offensive and wrong.
qualifying claims.

The Division gladly pays

The few cases which have to be contested in

court are the cases which make claims beyond the limits
established in the statute, or which have underlying judgments
which cannot serve as the basis for recovery.

As the record in

this case clearly demonstrates, the Division has always
maintained that the McBrides are entitled to recover $10,000.
The McBrides have filed no cross-appeal and are not entitled to
make any assignments of error or request for relief beyond
affirmation of the District Court's decision.

The Court should

not consider their arguments which go beyond the issues raised by
the Division on appeal.
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Therefore, the Division prays the court reverse the
order of the District Court, and remand the case for entry of
judgment in the amount of $10,000.00.
Respectfully submitted this 31

day of May, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attdrriey General
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